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While	we	 know	 a	 lot	 about	 these	 developmental	 patterns	 in	 human	 primates,	 we	 know	
relatively	little	about	whether	nonhuman	primates	share	these	early	life	trajectories.	In	this	
dissertation	 I	 identify	 and	 explore	 three	 open	 questions	 using	 this	 comparative	
developmental	psychology	method.	In	Chapter	2	(Arre,	Clark,	and	Santos,	2020),	I	compare	
the	developmental	trajectory	of	an	early	emerging	theory	of	mind	ability—	the	capacity	to	
represent	what	others	see—	in	a	primate	species	 to	 the	existing	established	trajectory	 in	
human	infants.	In	Chapter	3	(Arre,	Stumph,	&	Santos,	2021),	I	look	at	the	plasticity	of	this	
same	 capacity	 to	 represent	 what	 others	 see	 by	 comparing	 adults	 of	 two	 closely-related	
species	that	vary	in	their	socioecology.	These	chapters	together	provide	a	new	perspective	




by	more	 knowledgeable	 agents	 as	 compared	 to	 less	 knowledgeable	 agents.	 Across	 these	
three	experiments,	I	find	that	despite	some	developmental	delays	(Chapter	2),	the	ability	to	
represent	what	others	see	seems	otherwise	relatively	adult-like	even	in	early	life,	regardless	
























































































CHAPTER	 2:	 Do	 young	 rhesus	 macaques	 (Macaca	 mulatta)	 know	 what	 others	 see?:		
comparative	developmental	perspective……………………………………………….............38	
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social	 cognition	 by	 studying	 a	 different	 population:	 non-human	 primates	 (hereafter	
primates).	 Studying	 primates	 allows	 scientists	 to	 piece	 together	 phylogenetic	 origins	 of	
social	cognition.	Typically,	researchers	test	adult	primate	subjects	on	a	task	of	interest	and	
compare	their	results	to	those	of	human	infants	and	children.	
Testing	 the	 cognitive	 capacities	 of	 our	 closest	 living	 relatives	 allows	 researchers	
insight	into	a	number	of	questions	about	human	cognition.	First,	studying	primates	allow	us	
to	 determine	 which	 cognitive	 abilities	 are	 unique	 to	 humans.	 This	 “human-uniqueness”	
question	has	motivated	the	field	of	comparative	cognition	more	broadly	since	its	conception,	
and	work	with	primates	 is	no	exception.	Additionally,	primate	work	allows	us	 to	 identify	
which	 aspects	 of	 our	 social	 cognition	 are	 part	 of	 our	 core	 knowledge.	 Proposed	 first	 by	
Spelke	(2004),	core	knowledge	theory	proposes	that	humans	are	evolutionarily	endowed	
with	 a	 set	 of	 innate	 domains	 of	 knowledge	 that	 scaffolds	 much	 of	 our	 later	 developing	
cognition	(Spelke	2004;	Spelke	&	Kinzler,	2007;	Kinzler	&	Spelke,	2007).	Since	primates	are	
our	 closest	 living	 relatives,	 they	 are	 thought	 to	 possess	 many	 of	 the	 core	 knowledge	



















Traditional	 comparative	 psychological	 has	 been	 instrumental	 in	 laying	 the	
foundation	for	our	understanding	of	the	origins	of	human	cognitive	capacities.	However,	the	
nature	of	this	type	of	research	results	in	a	gap	in	our	knowledge.	By	treating	all	subjects	as	
homogenous,	 regardless	 of	 age,	 sex,	 and	 other	 social	 factors	 (e.g.,	 rank,	 social	

























	 There	are	a	 few	 limitations	 to	consider	with	 this	method	of	exact	age	comparison.	






























that	 in	 any	 other	 primate	 species.	 	 Some	 scholars	 have	 proposed	 that	 our	 human-like	












lacking	many	 of	 the	 experiences	 that	 human	 children	 have	 in	 early	 life	with	 object	 play,	





	 Despite	 early	 successes	 from	 the	 comparative	 cognitive	 developmental	 approach,	





in	 the	 types	 of	 early	 life	 experience	 (Tomasello,	 2020),	 especially	when	 it	 comes	 to	 how	
humans	begin	to	attend	to	and	learn	from	others.	Thus,	comparative	cognitive	development	





	 In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 will	 use	 a	 comparative	 developmental	 approach	 to	 explore	 the	
development	 of	 two	 different	 social	 cognitive	 capacities	 in	 primates—	 theory	 of	 mind	
abilities	and	social	learning	capacities.	I	begin	with	a	review	of	work	in	the	domain	of	theory	





these	 capacities	 in	 humans	 and	 the	 extent	 to	which	 adult	 primates	 share	 these	 abilities.	










used	both	 implicit	 and	 explicit	measures	 of	 theory	 of	mind	 representations.	 Some	of	 the	


















other’s	 mental	 states.	 One	 commonly	 method—	 looking	 time	 or	 violation	 of	 expectancy	
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paradigm	 —	 is	 a	 measure	 first	 used	 to	 test	 questions	 about	 infants’	 visual	 perception	
(Berlyne,	1958;	Fantz,	1958).	This	method	uses	a	natural	behavior	of	infants;	that	is,	when	
surprised,	infants	will	look	longer	at	an	object	or	scenario.	The	looking	time	task,	has	been	
extended	 to	 test	 infants’	understanding	of	objects	and	object	properties	 (e.g.,	Baillargeon	








scenario	 that	 depicts	 another	 agents’	 mental	 state—	 typically	 what	 another	 agent	 sees,	
knows,	or	believes	about	the	location	of	a	hidden	object.	Participants	then	watch	as	the	agent	





















using	 anticipatory	 looking	 have	 shown	 that	 infants	 predict	 that	 an	 agent	who	 possesses	
knowledge	or	beliefs	about	the	location	of	a	hidden	object	will	act	on	the	basis	of	those	beliefs	
(Southgate,	Senju,	&	Csibra,	2007;	He,	Boltz,	&	Baillargeon,	2012;	Clements	&	Perner,	1994;	

























whether	chimpanzees	possessed	a	 theory	of	mind.	Their	 fundamental	work	attempted	 to	
investigate	the	mentalizing	abilities	of	a	single	chimpanzee,	and	found	that	their	subject	was	
capable	of	recognizing	the	experimenter’s	mental	states	(i.e.,	his	intentions),	as	well	as	what	









In	 line	with	 the	 infant	work,	much	work	 in	 primate	 theory	 of	mind	 uses	 implicit	
measures	 to	 test	 what	 primate	 subjects	 know	 about	 other	 agents’	 mental	 states.	 Many	
primate	 theory	of	mind	 studies	 to	date	have	used	a	 looking	 time	violation	of	 expectancy	
paradigm.	Similar	to	when	using	this	method	in	 infants,	researchers	assume	that	primate	
subjects	 will	 look	 longer	 when	 an	 unexpected	 event	 occurs	 as	 compared	 to	 when	 an	











are	 often	 very	 different	 than	 the	 verbal	methods	 used	 to	 test	 children’s	 theory	 of	mind	
capacities.	Primate	explicit	measures	are	typically	nonverbal	tasks	that	require	subjects	to	
act	on	the	basis	of	their	own	understanding	of	another	agent’s	mental	state.	Many	of	these	
tasks	 involve	competitive	situations	 in	which	subjects	must	 take	 into	account	what	other	
agents	see,	know,	or	believe	when	competing	for	resources	(Bräuer	et	al.,	2007;	Hare	et	al.,	








findings	can	perhaps	best	be	understood	as	showing	 that	primates	possess	at	 least	 three	










and	 human	 experimenters	 (Povinelli	 &	 Eddy,	 1996;	 Tomasello,	 Call,	 &	 Hare,	 1998:	
Tomasello,	Call,	and	Hare	1998;	Emery	et	al.,	1997;	Burkart	and	Heschl,	2006;	Neiworth	et	
al.,	 2002;	 Shepherd	and	Platt,	 2008;	 Sandel,	MacLean,	 and	Hare,	 2011;	Ruiz,	Roeder,	 and	
Byrne,	2009,	for	a	review,	see	Rosati	&	Hare,	2009).	More	recently,	primate	researchers	have	
developed	more	 complex	 gaze	 following	 tasks,	 ones	 that	 require	 subjects	 to	 follow	 gaze	
towards	 a	 specific	 target	 object,	 often	 around	 a	 barrier	 or	 through	 a	window.	 Such	 new	
geometric	gaze	following	tasks	require	subjects	to	recognize	that	there	is	a	referent	to	an	





















as	many	of	 our	 social	 interactions	 and	 relationships	 also	depend	on	understanding	what	
others	know.	Researchers	have	thus	also	focused	on	testing	whether	primates	can	represent	
the	knowledge	of	others	using	both	explicit	and	 implicit	 tasks.	This	work	has	shown	that	







the	 food	 was	 under.	 Importantly,	 experimenters	 varied	 the	 knowledge	 state	 of	 the	





cup	 that	 they	 alone	 knew	 had	 food	 inside	 (Kaminski	 et	 al.,	 2008).	 The	 authors	 of	 the	
experiment	 took	 this	 pattern	 of	 performance	 as	 evidence	 that	 the	 chimpanzees	 could	
represent	the	knowledge	and	ignorance	states	of	their	competitors	


















but	 in	 a	 critical	 test	 condition,	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 object	 changed	 out	 of	 view	 of	 the	
experimenter.	 In	the	condition	 in	which	the	object’s	 identity	remained	the	same,	subjects	



















how	much	 information	each	subject	had	about	 the	content	of	 three	buckets	on	 the	 table.	
Specifically,	 the	 researchers	 tested	whether	 one	 chimpanzee	 (the	 subject)	would	 change	
their	choice	behavior	in	response	to	what	the	other	chimpanzee	(the	competitor)	was	aware	
of	(Study	1)	and	believed	(Study	2).	When	required	to	act	in	accordance	with	another	agent’s	
belief	 state,	 their	behavior	did	not	differ	 from	their	behavior	 in	 the	 ignorant	condition	of	
Study	1.	In	other	words,	subjects	failed	to	represent	the	false	belief	of	the	competitor,	and	






































However,	 this	 suggestion	 would	 not	 explain	 chimpanzees’	 previous	 failures	 on	 tasks	
requiring	 them	 to	 act	 on	 their	 false	 beliefs,	 in	 presumably	 sufficiently	 stimulating	 social	
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situations	 they	 faced	 in	 earlier	 tasks	 using	 competitive	 measures	 (Kaminski,	 Call,	 &	
Tomasello,	1999;	Hare,	Call,	&	Tomasello,	2001;	Kaminski,	Call,	&	Tomasello,	2008;	Krachun	
et	al.,	2009;	Krachun,	Call,	&	Tomasello,	2010).		




on	 their	 false	belief	 representations.	However,	we	know	from	decades	of	 research	 in	 this	
domain	 that	 chimpanzees	 exhibit	 inhibitory	 control	 consistent	 with	 that	 of	 children	 old	








In	 humans,	we	 know	 that	 from	a	 young	 age,	 infants	 seem	 capable	 of	 implicit	 false	 belief	
representations,	but	these	early	emerging	implicit	abilities	set	the	stage	for	later	emerging	
explicit	false	belief	representations	where	children	can	act	based	on	others’	beliefs	(Scott	&	
Baillargeon,	 2017;	 Wellman	 &	 Liu,	 2004).	 So,	 while	 young	 preverbal	 infants	 cannot	 act	
explicitly	on	the	content	of	their	false	belief	representations,	they	will	eventually	be	able	to	





(Kaminski,	 Call,	 &	 Tomasello,	 1999;	 Hare,	 Call,	 &	 Tomasello,	 2001;	 Kaminski,	 Call,	 &	
Tomasello,	2008;	Krachun	et	al.,	2009;	Krachun,	Call,	&	Tomasello,	2010),	even	though	recent	
work	has	hinted	that	they	at	least	possess	these	representations	and	can	accurately	predict	
agent	 behavior	based	on	 the	 subjects’	 representations	of	 another	 agent	 (Krupenye	 et	 al.,	
2016;	 Kano	 et	 al.,	 2019).	 Whether	 agent	 behavior	 prediction	 is	 a	 sufficient	 benefit	 of	 a	
capacity	to	represent	the	false	beliefs	of	others	is	an	open	question,	especially	given	subjects’	
inability	 to	 act	 based	 on	 these	 predictions	 in	 contexts	 requiring	 subjects	 to	 participate	










theories	 to	 date	 do	 not	 clarify	 why	 adult	 primates	 seem	 to	 show	 differences	 in	 their	
mentalizing	abilities.	Fortunately,	comparative	developmental	psychology	may	provide	tools	




different	 sociocognitive	 abilities	 in	 human	 infants	 (Wellman	 &	 Liu,	 2004),	 including	
comparing	infants	of	different	ages	on	the	same	or	theoretically	similar	tasks,	comparative	
developmental	psychology	is	well-positioned	to	answer	this	question.	To	date,	primate	social	






Given	 the	 uncertainty	 in	 both	 the	 developmental	 and	 comparative	 literatures	
regarding	nonverbal	populations’	abilities	to	form	belief	state	representations,	we	chose	to	













Typically,	we	 think	 of	 primate	 cognition	 as	 fairly	 stable	 across	 species,	with	 little	
interspecies	 variation.	 However,	 closely	 related	 species	 vary	 a	 lot	 in	 terms	 of	 their	
environmental	and	social	factors.	By	comparing	the	cognitive	abilities	of	adult	primates	that	
vary	 in	 their	 social	 and	 environmental	 histories,	 researchers	 can	 test	 more	 specific	
hypotheses	about	how	human	cognition	has	evolved.	Take	for	example	questions	about	the	
nature	 of	 early	 human	 sociality	 and	 social	 cognition:	 many	 different	 theories	 about	 the	
specific	circumstances	that	have	led	to	human-like	cognition.	Primates	are	uniquely	poised	
to	answer	this	question,	due	in	part,	to	their	diversity	in	their	social	groups,	social	structures,	
and	 social	 environments,	 and	 the	 obvious	 implications	 that	 these	 tests	 have	 for	 learning	
more	about	our	own	evolution	(MacLean	et	al.,	2012).	
	 Below	I	review	several	aspects	of	primates’	early	social	environments	that	vary	across	
different	 primate	 species.	 By	 comparing	 the	 social	 cognitive	 abilities	 of	 individuals	 with	








social	groups	 is	beneficial	 for	 finding	and	monopolizing	resources,	warding	off	predators,	
and	for	increased	mating	opportunities.	However,	there	are	many	challenges	to	group	living	



















this	work	has	been	conducted	within	 the	 lemur	genus—	while	 lemurs	are	closely	related	
(Hovarth	et	al.,	2008),	 they	vary	drastically	 in	 their	group	size	 (Richard	&	Dewar,	1991).	
Some	species,	like	the	mongoose	lemur,	live	in	small	family	groups	of	typically	a	breeding	
pair	and	their	offspring	(Curtis	&	Zaramody,	1999).	Alternatively,	other	species,	such	as	the	





lemur	 are	 better	 at	 using	 experimenters’	 visual	 perspective	 to	 obtain	 a	 reward	 in	 social	
cognition	 tasks	 than	 small	 group	 living	 species	 like	 the	mongoose	 lemur	 (MacLean	et	 al.,	











different	 types	 of	 mating	 systems	 like	 multi-male/multi-female,	 or	 harem	 type	 social	
structures	(Dunbar	&	Shultz,	2007;	Shultz	&	Dunbar,	2007).	What	makes	these	species	the	






status,	 where	 we	 would	 see	 increased	 social	 skills	 critical	 for	 effective	 relationship	
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management	 and	 mate	 choice,	 like	 emotional	 regulation,	 facial	 recognition,	 and	 kin	
recognition.		
While	 very	 little	 work	 has	 tested	 this	 hypothesis	 directly,	 there	 has	 been	 much	
research	with	both	pair	bonding	species	of	primates	and	polygamous	primate	species.	Early	
work	in	social	cognition	within	pair	bonding	species	has	looked	at	callitrichid	monkeys	like	
the	 tamarins	and	marmosets	 (Huber	&	Voelkl,	2009;	Snowdon.	2001).	 In	one	such	study,	
researchers	 tested	 whether	 tamarins	 were	 capable	 of	 using	 an	 experimenters’	 visual	
perspective	to	make	predictions	about	her	behavior	(Santos	&	Hauser,	1999).	In	the	task,	
tamarins	were	capable	of	using	head	position	and	gaze	position	to	predict	an	agent’s	actions.	






when	 deciding	 who	 to	 steal	 from	 (Sánchez-Amaro	 et	 al.,	 2020).	 Like	 non-pairbonded	
macaques,	gibbons	were	capable	of	using	body	position	to	determine	which	experimenter	
from	whom	they	should	take	food	–	taking	food	significantly	more	from	the	experimenter	
oriented	 away	 from	 them	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 one	 facing	 them.	 However,	 gibbons	 were	
incapable	of	using	eyes	alone,	and	did	not	steal	any	more	from	a	person	whose	eyes	were	
closed,	 as	 compared	 to	 a	 person	 whose	 eyes	 were	 open.	 While	 not	 a	 direct	 test	 of	




















Another	 factor	 to	 consider	when	 thinking	 about	 the	 social	 factors	 affecting	 social	
cognition	in	primate	species	is	a	species’	social	tolerance.	Social	tolerance	refers	to	the	level	
of	aggressive	versus	affiliative	interactions	between	group	members	(Thierry,	2007).	Social	






hypothesis	 that	seeks	 to	address	 this	question,	 the	Machiavellian	 Intelligence	Hypothesis,	
argues	 that	 these	 challenges	 are	 exactly	 what	 make	 us,	 and	 our	 closest	 living	 primate	
relatives,	so	socially	intelligent	(Whiten	&	Byrne,	1997).	As	a	factor	of	our	large	group	living,	
individuals	survive	by	exploiting	the	perceptions,	knowledge,	and	beliefs	of	others,	in	order	
to	 maximize	 food,	 shelter,	 and	 mating	 opportunities.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 most	 successful	
individuals	 are	 those	 that	 are	 socially	 intelligent,	 and	 are	 capable	 of	 out-competing	
conspecifics	 for	 resource	 opportunities.	 An	 alternative	 and	 more	 recent	 hypothesis,	 the	
Survival	of	 the	Friendliest	or	Social	Tolerance	Hypothesis	paints	a	 rosier	picture	of	early	




Critically,	 these	 hypotheses	 make	 specific	 predictions	 about	 a	 particular	 suite	 of	
sociocognitive	abilities.	Mentalizing	abilities,	 including	perspective,	knowledge,	and	belief	




degree	 of	 social	 tolerance	 on	 their	 social	 cognition,	 to	 determine	 under	what	 conditions	
human	mentalizing	abilities	are	more	 likely	to	have	evolved.	 In	primates,	social	 tolerance	
refers	to	the	degree	to	which	species	vary	in	their	rates	of	aggression:	some	species	are	more	
despotic,	 characterized	 by	 their	 high	 and	 unbalanced	 rates	 of	 aggression,	 low	 rates	 of	










perceptions	be	more	conducive	 to	human-like	visual	perspective	 taking	abilities,	 then	we	
would	 expect	 that	 a	 primate	 species	 with	 low	 levels	 of	 social	 tolerance,	 and	 thus,	more	
experience	in	early	life	using	the	visual	access	of	others	for	their	own	personal	gain,	to	show	
better	 visual	 perspective	 taking	 abilities.	 Alternatively,	 and	more	 in	 line	 with	 the	 Social	














other	 species	 has	 developed	 as	 sophisticated	 (Csibra,	 2007;	 Whiten,	 2000;	 Tomasello,	
Kruger,	&	Ratner,	1993;	Whiten	&	van	de	Waal,	2017)	an	ability	 to	 teach	and	 learn	 from	
others	as	effectively	as	humans.	





action,	 suggesting	 that	 both	 populations	 learned	 something	 from	 witnessing	 the	
demonstration		(Nagell,	Olguin,	&	Tomasello,	1993),	though	they	differed	in	the	fidelity	with	



















skill-learning	 task,	 it	did	not	appear	 that	monkeys	were	using	demographic	 factors	other	
than	 rank	 as	markers	 of	 social	 expertise	 (Canteloup,	 Hoppitt,	 &	 van	 de	Waal,	 2020).	 	 In	
another	study,	researchers	tracked	how	young	nut-cracking	novice	monkeys	attended	to	the	
behaviors	of	others	(Coelho	et	al.,	2015),	and	found	that	young	capuchin	monkeys	choose	to	

















are	 sensitive	 to	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 gaze	 cue	presenter	with	 convergent	 results;	 that	 is,	 it	










As	 such,	 comparative	developmental	psychology	 can	be	particularly	useful	 for	 the	
social	learning	question	presented	here	for	a	few	reasons.	First,	primates	are	lacking	in	both	
their	ability	 to	 teach	(Gergely	&	Csibra,	2013;	Skerry	et	al.,	2013;	Hoppitt,	2013)	and	 the	











preference	 for	 information	 from	older	 adult	 demonstrators	 instead	 of	 other	 children.	 To	
what	degree	are	these	preferences	shared	by	young	primates?	By	testing	primates	across	






My	 dissertation	 will	 explore	 comparative	 social	 cognitive	 development	 in	 one	
primate	genus	 in	particular:	macaques.	Of	the	many	potential	subject	species,	 the	Macaca	
genus	is	ideal	for	studying	human	cognitive	evolution	using	the	comparative	developmental	
perspective	 due	 to	 their	 adaptability,	 sociality,	 mirrored	 development,	 and	 accessibility.	
After	 humans,	 macaques	 are	 the	 most	 geographically	 widespread	 primate	 genus	 (Fa	 &	
Lindburg,	1996).	Macaques	thrive	on	the	perimeters	of	human	settlements	and	have	adapted	
to	many	different	types	of	ecological	conditions,	from	tropical	climates	to	mountain	terrain	
(Fooden,	 1982).	 Across	 the	 lifespan,	 macaques	 share	 many	 of	 the	 same	 life	 history	
transitions	 present	 in	 humans.	 Though	 shortened	 and	 accelerated	 in	 some	ways	 (Leigh,	
2004;	Bogin	&	Smith,	1996),	macaque	development	is	punctuated	by	three	main	biological	







come	 from	having	 to	 compete	with	members	of	your	group	 for	 food,	 shelter,	 and	mating	
opportunities	are	significant.	Macaques	species	vary	in	how	they	address	the	challenges	that	
come	with	group	living.	Macaque	species	vary	drastically	in	their	exhibited	social	tolerance	
across	species	 (Thierry,	2000;	2007),	 though	 they	maintain	high	genetic	 fidelity	between	
species	(Melnick	&	Kidd,	1985).	Therefore,	primatologists	have	categorized	them	into	four	
separate	groups	based	on	their	exhibited	social	tolerance	(Thierry,	2007).	On	one	end	of	the	
spectrum	are	 the	very	 tolerant	Grade	4	macaques.	These	 species,	 including	Tonkean	and	
crested	macaques	show	more	reconciliatory	behaviors,	 less	kin	bias	 in	social	 interactions	
(i.e.,	 are	more	 egalitarian	 in	 grooming	 distribution),	 and	 less	 aggression	 than	macaques	
falling	 into	 the	Grade	1	 category	 such	as	 rhesus	and	 Japanese	macaques	 (Thierry,	2007).		
Thus,	 the	 genus	 presents	 a	 unique	 opportunity	 to	 study	 how	 differential	 early	 life	
experiences	with	varying	levels	of	social	tolerance	(i.e.,	growing	up	in	a	highly	tolerant	or	




									 To	date,	 existing	work	has	 explored	 the	question	of	human-uniqueness	of	 various	
cognitive	 abilities	 by	 testing	 small	 captive	 populations	 in	 closed	 laboratories	 and	 zoos.	
Though	this	work	built	 the	 foundation	 for	 the	 field	of	comparative	cognition,	 it	 limits	 the	
ways	that	we	can	extrapolate	the	data,	especially	to	answer	the	questions	of	comparative	
cognitive	 development.	 For	 instance,	 in	 these	 settings,	 individuals	 are	 often	 housed	 as	










									 Fortunately,	 several	 field	 sites	 boast	 exactly	 these	 conditions,	 making	 them	 ideal	
macaque	populations	 for	 this	 research.	At	 the	Cayo	 Santiago	Biological	 Field	 Station	 and	
Trentham	Monkey	Forest,	subjects	are	free-living	in	a	semi-naturalistic,	small	island	and	a	
botanical	park	respectively.	From	birth,	individuals	are	able	to	interact	with	conspecifics	of	
















us	 better	 understand	 the	 causal	 mechanisms	 at	 play.	 In	 Chapter	 3,	 I	 use	 comparative	
developmental	psychology	 to	 compare	 two	 competing	hypotheses	 about	 the	 evolution	of	
human	cognition.	Specifically,	by	comparing	two	adults	of	two	species	with	very	different	
early	life	social	experiences,	I	examine	the	outcome	of	those	varying	social	environments	on	
their	 ability	 to	 represent	 what	 others	 can	 see.	 Finally,	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 I	 look	 at	 another	




Chapter	2:	Do	 young	monkeys	 know	what	 others	 see?:	A	 comparative	developmental	
perspective.	(Arre,	Clark,	&	Santos,	2020)	
In	 the	 first	 empirical	 chapter,	 I	 examine	 the	 discrepancy	 in	 human	 and	 primate	
mentalizing	 abilities	 by	 looking	 at	 a	 previously	 understudied	 area	 of	 primate	 social	
cognition:	 the	 development	 of	 perspective	 taking	 abilities.	 Mental	 state	 representational	
abilities	like	visual	perspective	taking	make	the	perfect	test	case	for	this	question	for	a	couple	


































Chapter	 3:	 Macaques	 with	 varying	 social	 tolerance	 show	 no	 differences	 in	
understanding	what	others	perceive	(Arre,	Stumph,	&	Santos,	2021)	
									 In	 my	 second	 empirical	 chapter,	 I	 explore	 the	 role	 that	 the	 socioecological	
environment	 plays	 in	 sociocognitive	 development.	 Specifically,	 two	 theories	 propose	








Thus,	macaques	present	 a	perfect	 test	 case	 for	 examining	whether	 competitive	 or	
cooperative	environments	better	elicit	more	human-like	perspective	taking	abilities,	as	they	
exhibit	a	natural	broad	spectrum	of	social	tolerance	across	species.	Specifically,	by	testing	
adult	 macaques	 on	 both	 ends	 of	 the	 tolerance	 spectrum,	 I	 can	 examine	 what	 types	 of	
developmental	 experiences	 in	 early	 life	 are	 more	 suited	 to	 elicit	 human-like	 visual	
perspective	taking	abilities	in	adulthood.	To	investigate	this,	I	compare	adults	in	two	species	









puzzle	 box	 tasks	 to	 investigate	 questions	 on	 nonhuman	 animal	 social	 learning	 abilities,	
despite	much	of	a	primate’s	natural	ecology	being	largely	social	in	nature.	To	address	this	
omission,	in	the	final	empirical	chapter,	I	have	devised	a	task	that	exploits	a	natural	social	
behavior	 in	 monkeys,	 gaze	 following,	 to	 whether	 primates	 show	 human	 children	 like	
preferences	 for	 older,	 expert	 agents	 (Wood,	Kendal,	&	Flynn,	 2012;	 Seehagen	&	Herbert,	
2011;	Jaswal	&	Neely,	2006;	Elekes	&	Kiraly,	2012;	Kachel	et	al.,	2018;	2021)	in	a	naturalistic	
task.	 	 I	will	 test	rhesus	macaques,	which	are	highly	social	(Rawlins	&	Kessler,	1986),	 face	
many	of	the	same	social	challenges	as	humans,	and	show	human-like	facial	perception	(Dahl	
et	 al.,	 2009;	 Rosenfeld	&	Van	Hoesen,	 1979)	 and	 perspective	 taking	 abilities	 (Drayton	&	


















Humans	 undergo	 robust	 ontogenetic	 shifts	 in	 theory	 of	 mind	 capabilities.	 Are	 these	
developmental	changes	unique	to	human	development	or	are	they	shared	with	other	closely	
related	non-human	species?	To	explore	this	question,	we	tested	the	development	of	theory	
of	mind	 capacities	 in	 a	 population	 of	 236	 infant	 and	 juvenile	 rhesus	macaques	 (Macaca	
mulatta).	Using	a	looking-time	method,	we	examined	what	developing	monkeys	know	about	
others’	perceptions.	Specifically,	we	tested	whether	younger	monkeys	predict	that	a	person	
will	 reach	 for	 an	object	where	 she	 last	 saw	 it.	Overall,	we	 found	a	 significant	 interaction	
between	 a	 monkey’s	 age	 and	 performance	 on	 this	 task	 (p	 =	 0.014).	 Juvenile	 monkeys	







young	 rhesus	macaques	appear	 to	 show	some	 interest	 in	 the	perception	of	other	agents.	















mental	 experiences	 is	 largely	 a	 point	 of	 contention,	 as	 decades	 of	 research	 suggest	 that	





While	 adult	 humans	 exhibit	 fairly	 stable	 theory	 of	mind	 abilities,	 human	 infants	 and	
children	undergo	rich	developmental	transitions	in	their	theory	of	mind	abilities	(Wellman,	
Fang,	&	Peterson	2011;	Wellman	&	Liu	2004).	Almost	from	birth,	infants	show	a	proclivity	
for	 making	 eye	 contact	 with	 other	 agents	 (Haith,	 Bergman,	 &	 Moore	 1977)	 that	 likely	
provides	 an	 important	 scaffold	 for	 later	 developing	 theory	 of	mind	 abilities.	 Later	 on	 in	









Liu,	 2004).	 Lastly,	 and	not	 typically	until	 late	 adolescence,	do	we	 see	more	 sophisticated	
reasoning	 about	 other	 agents’	 linguistic	 intentions,	 including	 nuances	 such	 as	metaphor	
usage	and	irony	(Happé,	1994).	
Some	of	 the	most	 famous	evidence	 for	sophisticated	 theory	of	mind	 like	abilities	 is	 in	





and	use	 this	perspective	 to	 form	expectations	 for	how	other	agents	should	act,	 then	 they	
should	look	longer	when	the	presenter	does	the	unexpected	thing	and	reaches	into	the	empty	
box.	Indeed,	Onishi	and	Baillargeon	found	that	infants	do	look	longer	when	another	agent	
















social	 structure,	we	 can	 test	what	 aspects	 of	 complex	 sociality	 is	 enough	 to	 scaffold	 the	
emergence	 of	 some	 of	 these	 sociocognitive	 abilities.	 Rhesus	 macaques	 exhibit	 a	 linear	
dominance	hierarchy,	whereby	individuals	must	compete	for	resources	including	water	and	












behavior	 when	 the	 other	 agent	 is	 knowledgeable	 or	 ignorant	 (Drayton	 &	 Santos,	 2017;	






we	actually	know	very	 little	about	social	cognition	changes	 in	younger	 individuals	of	 this	
species.	 However,	 these	 types	 of	 comparative	 developmental	 studies	 are	 important	 for	
informing	critical	theories	in	human	development,	specifically	those	theories	outlining	what	
kinds	 of	 experiences	 are	 necessary	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 certain	 sociocognitive	 abilities	
(Rosati	et	al.,	2014;	Tomasello,	2019).	While	adult	primates	share	with	humans	a	complex	
social	structure,	and	frequent	engagement	and	observance	of	social	interactions,	they	lack	




assessing	 visual	 perspective	 taking	 that	 had	 previously	 been	 validated	 both	with	 human	




social	 cognitive	 development	 in	macaques	 from	 this	 same	 population.	 In	 one	 such	 study	
(Rosati	et	al.,	2016),	researchers	investigated	the	developmental	trajectory	of	gaze	following,	
or	the	ability	to	co-orient	with	another	individual.	They	found	that	despite	different	early	
socioecology,	 rhesus	 macaque	 gaze-following	 abilities	 followed	 a	 human-like,	 but	
developmentally	 delayed	 trajectory.	 For	 young	 rhesus	 macaques,	 this	 means	 some	 gaze	



















Subjects.	 We	 tested	 infant	 and	 juvenile	 rhesus	 macaques	 from	 the	 Cayo	 Santiago	
Biological	Field	Station	population	(Rawlins	&	Kessler,	1986),	a	small	research	site	on	an	
island	off	the	east	coast	of	Puerto	Rico.	The	field	site	has	been	in	operation	since	1938,	and	
is	 home	 to	 over	 1500	 free-ranging	 macaques.	 At	 one	 year	 of	 age,	 each	 monkey	 in	 this	







































stand	over	or	kneel	beside	E1	and	begin	 filming	 the	subject.	At	 the	start	of	each	 trial,	E1	
would	set	the	apparatus	stage	and	then	call	‘now’	as	she	dropped	the	occluder.	At	this	cue,	
E2	would	begin	timing.	After	ten	seconds,	E2	would	call	‘stop’.	Each	study	session	consisted	
































2017	 through	 15	 January	 2017).	 To	 ensure	 consistency	 across	 data	 collection	 trips,	 we	











to	 condition;	we	 removed	 all	 identifying	 information	 (including	 subject	 ID,	 trial	 number,	
condition,	and	session	type)	from	each	clip	and	gave	each	a	randomized	identifying	code.	
Two	independent	experimenters	each	coded	all	of	the	clips	for	subject	looking	time	towards	




are	 the	 same	 regardless	 of	 data	 used.	 All	 analyses	 were	 done	 using	 RStudio	 statistical	
software,	Version	1.0.153	(R	Core	Team,	2013).	
	































when	 the	 presenter	 reached	 inconsistently	 with	 her	 visual	 perspective	 (unexpected	
	
	 50	
condition)	 than	 when	 she	 acted	 accordingly	 with	 her	 visual	 perspective	 (expected	
condition).	 Infant	monkeys	showed	the	reverse	 trend,	 looking	 longer	when	the	presenter	
reached	 consistently	 with	 her	 visual	 perspective	 as	 compared	 to	 when	 she	 acted	
inconsistently	with	her	visual	perspective.	
To	be	sure	that	monkeys	assigned	to	the	inconsistent	reach	condition	were	not	looking	
longer	 across	 the	 entire	 study	 session,	 we	 also	 confirmed	 that	 the	 looking	 during	 the	
familiarization	 trials	 was	 functionally	 the	 same	 between	 conditions	 within	 each	 cohort.	
Using	Welch’s	t-tests,	overall	we	found	no	significant	differences	between	conditions	in	the	
familiarization	trials.	In	the	first	familiarization	trial,	we	found	no	significant	difference	in	


















age	 variance	 between	 condition	 [F1,	 116	 =	 0.99784,	 p	 =	 0.9911),	 so	 a	 differential	 age	







significant	 trend	 in	 which	 juvenile	 rhesus	 macaques	 looked	 slightly	 longer	 when	 the	
























For	 this	 reason,	 the	 trends	 we	 observed	 within	 each	 group	 should	 be	 considered	 with	
caution.	
Assuming	 these	 results	 hold	 when	 larger	 within-age	 samples	 are	 tested,	 there	 are	 a	
number	 of	 possible	 explanations	 for	 significant	 developmental	 change	 we	 seem	 to	 have	
observed.	One	possibility	is	that	monkeys’	development	of	visual	perspective	taking	shows	
a	human-like	pattern,	but	young	monkeys	are	delayed	 in	 their	ability	 to	make	 inferences	
about	 how	 another	 agent	 will	 act	 based	 on	 this	 visual	 perspective	 representation.	 This	
parallel,	 but	 delayed,	 developmental	 pattern	 of	 visual	 perspective	 taking	 in	 macaques	
relative	to	humans	would	be	consistent	with	what	has	been	observed	in	other	sociocognitive	
domains.	 Specifically,	 this	 pattern	 mirrors	 the	 developmental	 pattern	 of	 gaze	 following	




While	 gaze	 following	 and	 perspective	 taking	 in	 human	 infants	 are	 present	 from	 an	
extremely	young	age,	the	emergence	of	these	abilities	in	primates	appears	delayed.	Taken	
together,	the	trending	results	presented	here,	and	those	from	prior	work	(Rosati	et	al.,	2016),	
suggest	 that	 young	 rhesus	 macaques	 may	 require	 more	 experience	 in	 order	 for	 their	
















Houston-Price	 &	 Nakai,	 2004).	 Specifically,	 human	 infants	 sometimes	 show	 preferential	
looking	to	the	familiar	or	expected	condition	rather	than	the	novel	or	unexpected	condition	




general	 aversion	 to	 novel	 events	 and	 stimuli,	 or	 neophobia,	 which	 human	 infants	 show	
around	 this	 age	 (e.g.,	 Hunter	 &	 Ames	 1988).	 	 However,	 it’s	 again	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	
difference	we	observed	in	infant	macaque	looking	across	conditions	was	non-significant	(p	
=	 0.06),	 and	 thus	we	 should	 be	 cautious	 in	 interpreting	 this	 pattern	 of	 performance	 too	
strongly.	
Taken	 together,	 this	 first	 test	 of	 nonhuman	 primate	 visual	 perspective-taking	
development	 shows	 that	 infant	 and	 juvenile	 rhesus	 macaques	 seem	 to	 undergo	 a	
developmental	 transition.	 This	 transition	 takes	 place	 some	 time	 around	 their	 first	 and	
second	year	of	age	as	infants	are	weaning	and	gaining	independence	from	their	mothers.	We	
found	 a	 significant	 interaction	 in	 looking	 time	 patterns	 between	 the	 two	 cohorts,	where	
juvenile	rhesus	monkeys	showed	a	trend	toward	more	adult-like	pattern	of	looking	longer	
at	 the	 unexpected	 condition,	 while	 infant	 rhesus	 showed	 the	 opposite	 trend.	 To	 further	
understand	this	pattern,	future	work	should	test	larger	within-age	cohorts	in	order	to	gain	
the	 statistical	 power	needed	 to	determine	whether	 these	 trends	 reflect	 the	 real	 patterns	
shown	by	these	age	groups.	Moreover,	future	work	should	also	attempt	to	tease	apart	the	
types	 of	 experiences	 required	 for	 these	 sociocognitive	 abilities	 to	 emerge,	 investigating	
behavioral	 differences	 around	 the	weaning	 transition	 (1	 year	 of	 age),	 to	 see	 how	 infant	
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A	 growing	body	 of	work	demonstrates	 that	 a	 species’	 socioecology	 can	 impact	 its	
cognitive	 abilities.	 Indeed,	 even	 closely	 related	 species	 with	 different	 socioecological	
pressures	often	show	different	patterns	of	cognitive	performance	on	the	same	task.	Here,	we	
explore	whether	major	differences	in	social	tolerance	in	two	closely	related	macaque	species	
can	 impact	 a	 core	 sociocognitive	 ability,	 the	 capacity	 to	 recognize	 what	 others	 see.	
Specifically,	we	compared	the	performance	of	Barbary	macaques	(Macaca	sylvanus,	n	=	80)	
and	 rhesus	macaques	 (Macaca	mulatta,	n	 =	 62)	 on	 a	 standard	 test	 of	 visual	 perspective	
understanding.	 In	contrast	 to	 the	difference	 in	performance	one	might	expect	 from	these	
species’	divergent	socioecologies,	our	results	show	similar	performance	across	Barbary	and	
rhesus	macaques,	with	both	species	forming	expectations	about	how	another	agent	will	act	





















physical	 environments	 shape	 their	 cognitive	 capacities.	 Indeed,	 social	 and	 ecological	
differences	can	drive	robust	cognitive	differences	in	otherwise	very	closely	related	species	
(for	 a	 review	 see	 MacLean	 et	 al.	 2012).	 These	 types	 of	 ecologically-based	 cognitive	
differences	 are	 especially	 salient	 in	 nonhuman	 primates	 (hereafter,	 primates),	 where	
researchers	 have	 uncovered	 a	 number	 of	 domains	 in	 which	 primates	 develop	 cognitive	
abilities	 that	 align	with	 the	 specific	 problems	 they	 naturally	 face	 in	 their	 own	 ecological	
niches	(Rosati	2017;	e.g.	chimpanzees	and	bonobos	in	Wrangham	&	Pilbeam	2001).		
Most	of	the	species-specific	differences	in	cognition	observed	to	date	have	been	cases	
of	 non-social	 cognitive	 abilities	 that	 vary	 across	 species	 with	 divergent	 feeding	 ecology.	
Foraging	primates	vary	in	the	extent	to	which	they	need	to	wait	to	obtain	their	food	sources	




show	differences	 in	 a	 set	 of	 relevant	 cognitive	 skills,	 such	 as	 temporal	 discounting,	 risk-
taking,	and	spatial	navigation.	Indeed,	researchers	have	observed	that	feeding	ecology	seems	
to	play	a	role	in	the	evolution	of	a	variety	of	such	cognitive	abilities.	For	instance,	species	that	
have	 to	wait	or	work	 for	 their	 food	 in	 the	wild	show	similar	patterns	 in	an	experimental	
cognitive	 task,	 waiting	 significantly	 longer	 for	 a	 better	 reward	 in	 tests	 of	 temporal	








cognitive	 capacities	 can	be	 shaped	by	 species’	 specific	 ecological	 differences,	 such	 as	 the	
degree	 to	which	 their	main	 food	 source	 is	 abundantly	distributed	 in	 their	 environments.	






















what	others	see.	They	compared	 five	 lemur	species	on	a	visual	perspective	 taking	 test	 in	
which	subjects	have	the	opportunity	to	steal	food	from	human	experimenters	who	can	and	
can’t	see	them	(see	Flombaum	&	Santos	2005;	Hare	et	al.	2000	for	a	similar	task).	They	found	






	 Another	aspect	of	 a	 species’	 social	 environment	 that	 is	 thought	 to	affect	 cognition	
concerns	a	species’	social	tolerance.	Some	species	are	more	despotic,	characterized	by	their	
high	 and	 unbalanced	 rates	 of	 aggresttion,	 low	 rates	 of	 reconciliation,	 kinship	 bias	 for	
affiliative	interactions		than	other	more	tolerant	species	(Aureli	et	al.	1997;	Thierry	1985).	A	
number	of	accounts	of	human	cognitive	evolution	hint	that	such	differences	in	tolerance	may	
be	 important	 for	 the	evolution	of	 complex	 social	 cognitive	abilities	 (e.g.	Hare,	Wobber,	&	
Wrangham,	2012;	Cieri	et	al.,	2014)	 like	cumulative	culture,	social	 learning,	and	language	
(Sánchez-Villagra	&	van	Schaik,	2019;	Thomas	&	Kirby,	2018;	Benítez-Burraco	&	Progovac,	
2020).	 For	 example,	 some	 scholars	 have	 argued	 that	 more	 despotic,	 competitive	 social	
environments	could	lead	to	the	evolution	of	richer	social	cognitive	skills	(Byrne	&	Whiten	








Hare,	 2017),	 a	 view	 that	 some	 have	 called	 the	 “self	 domestication”	 or	 “survival	 of	 the	





from	our	 closest	 living	 relatives,	 chimpanzees	 and	bonobos.	 For	 example,	 though	 closely	
related,	 bonobos	 and	 chimpanzees	 show	 different	 levels	 of	 tolerance	 both	 within	 and	
between	social	groups,	with	chimpanzees	exhibiting	much	less	tolerance	and	reconciliation	
than	bonobos	(Wrangham	&	Pilbeam	2001;	but	see	Jaeggi,	Stevens,	and	van	Schaik	2010).	
Bonobos	 show	 a	 stronger	 preference	 to	 look	 at	 social	 stimuli	 like	 faces	 and	 eyes	 than	
chimpanzees	(Kano,	Hirata,	&	Call	2015),	gaining	more	experience	 from	a	younger	age	at	















about	 how	 social	 tolerance	 shapes	 cognition.	 Joly	 and	 colleagues	 (2017)	 found	 that	 the	
different	 species	 showed	 similar	 levels	 of	 performance	 on	 non-social	 tests	 of	 causality,	
numerical	reasoning,	and	spatial	memory,	but	did	exhibit	performance	differences	on	at	least	
some	 tests	 of	 social	 cognition.	 	 For	 example,	 the	 different	 macaque	 species	 performed	
differently	on	a	social	object	choice	task,	in	which	subjects	had	to	follow	an	experimenter’s	
pointing	cue	towards	different	hiding	locations	to	receive	a	food	reward.	Tolerant	species	
were	more	 likely	 to	 succeed	 at	 the	 task,	 as	 compared	 to	 less	 tolerant	 species,	which	 the	
authors	argued	showed	that	 tolerant	species	have	better	social	cognition	as	compared	 to	
despotic	 species;	 interestingly,	 however,	 the	 tolerant	 and	 despotic	 species	 showed	 no	
differences	in	performance	in	the	other	tasks	assessing	social	cognition.		
In	 another	 experiment,	 Rosati	 and	 Santos	 (2017)	 found	 a	 difference	 in	 one	 social	
cognitive	 ability	 between	 tolerant	 and	 intolerant	 species,	 but	 only	 when	 evaluating	
developmental	differences.	In	their	experiment,	they	compared	gaze	following	rates	across	
the	 lifespan	 in	 tolerant	 Barbary	 macaques	 (Macaca	 sylvanus)	 to	 that	 of	 despotic	 rhesus	
macaques	(Macaca	mulatta).	Adults	in	both	species	do	not	seem	to	differ	in	their	propensity	
to	 gaze	 follow.	 However,	 their	 findings	 show	 an	 important	 developmental	 difference	
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between	 the	 two	 species;	 rhesus	 monkeys	 show	 marked	 decline	 in	 the	 degree	 of	 gaze	





	 Building	off	 this	work	and	to	 further	explore	the	extent	 to	which	tolerance	shapes	
complex	social	cognition	abilities,	we	compared	whether	two	species	of	macaques	that	vary	
in	 their	 social	 tolerance	 (see	 Thierry	 2007;	 Thierry,	 Singh,	 &	 Kaumanns	 2004;	 Thierry,	
Iwaniuk,	 Pellis	 2000)	 also	 vary	 in	 their	 capacity	 to	 understand	 another	 agents’	 visual	
perspective	 (Marticorena	et	 al.	 2011).	We	 chose	 to	 compare	 the	performance	of	Barbary	
macaques	and	rhesus	macaques	because	these	two	macaque	species	are	on	either	end	of	the	
tolerance	spectrum.	Rhesus	macaques	have	lower	levels	of	social	tolerance	and	social	life	is	
characterized	 by	 more	 hierarchical	 steepness,	 more	 violent	 inter-	 and	 intragroup	
encounters,	and	even	more	sophisticated	facial	expressions	indicating	submission	(Thierry,	
Iwaniuk,	 &	 Pellis	 2004)	 than	 species	 like	 Barbary	 macaques	 (Matsumura,	 1999).	 Visual	
perspective	 taking	 is	 the	 ideal	 cognitive	 ability	 to	 study	 this	 difference	 due	 to	 the	 two	
competing	 hypotheses	 about	 the	 effect	 of	 social	 tolerance	 on	 social	 cognition	 evolution.	
Specifically,	 the	Machiavellian	 Intelligence	Hypothesis	 (Humphrey,	 1976;	 de	Waal,	 2007;	
Byrne	&	Whiten	1990)	and	the	Self-Domestication	Hypothesis	(Hare,	Wobber,	&	Wrangham,	










on	a	well-validated	 looking	 time	measure	of	 visual	perspective	 taking,	one	 that	has	been	
















Higham	 2015).	 Looking	 time	 measures	 have	 been	 used	 widely	 in	 the	 developmental	
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literature	 for	 decades	 to	 test	 human	 infants’	 expectations	 about	 both	 the	 physical	
(Baillargeon	1995;	Baillargeon	1997;	Sobel	&	Kirkham	2006;	Hood,	Carey,	&	Prasaba	2000,	






2019;	 Drayton	 &	 Santos	 2016;	 Santos	 &	 Hauser	 1999).	 Moreover,	 several	 previously	
published	studies	have	included	control	conditions	that	test	for	deflationary	explanations	of	










Subjects.	 We	 compared	 the	 performance	 of	 two	 species	 of	 macaques:	 rhesus	






Monkeys	 at	 this	 site	 are	provisioned	daily,	 given	 ad	 libitum	access	 to	water,	 and	 receive	








access	 to	 water,	 and	 receive	 otherwise	 no	 medical	 intervention.	 Research	 has	 been	
conducted	 at	 the	 field	 site	 for	 over	 80	 years	 (for	 a	 review,	 see	Drayton	&	 Santos	 2016),	








rate	 (71%)	 is	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 previously	 published	 cognitive	 testing	with	 free-ranging	
monkey	populations	(Bettle	&	Rosati	2019;	Marticorena	et	al.	2011;	Hughes	&	Santos	2012;	
Martin	&	Santos	2014;	Drayton	&	Santos	2018;	Horschler,	Santos,	&	MacLean	2019;	Arre,	
Clark,	&	 Santos	 2019).	 Consistent	with	 other	 recent	 cognitive	 studies	 completed	 at	 Cayo	
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Santiago	 and	 Trentham	 Monkey	 Forest	 (Bettle	 &	 Rosati	 2019;	 Drayton	 &	 Santos	 2017;	
Drayton	&	Santos	2018;	Horschler,	Santos,	&	MacLean	2019;	Arre,	Clark,	&	Santos	2019),	
subjects	were	not	enticed	or	rewarded	for	their	task	performance	in	any	way.	All	subjects	




place	 on	 a	 stage	 built	 from	 foamcore	 [Figure	 1].	 As	 in	 the	 previously	 published	 study	





the	 inner	 side	of	each	box	was	 left	open	but	 trimmed	with	 fake	 leaves.	This	 leaf-covered	
opening	 allowed	 a	moving	 object	 (a	 plastic	 lemon)	 to	 enter	 and	 exit	 the	 two	 boxes,	 but	
prevented	 the	 subject	 from	 seeing	 the	 contents	 of	 the	 box.	 	We	 added	 a	 length-wise	 cut	
through	the	center	of	the	stage	to	create	a	track,	which	allowed	the	lemon	to	move	freely	









Two	 experimenters	 ran	 each	 session.	 To	 begin	 a	 session,	 both	 experimenters	
approached	a	calmly	sitting	monkey.	The	presenter	(E1)	knelt	roughly	one	to	three	meters	
away	and	placed	the	apparatus	between	herself	and	the	subject	monkey.	The	cameraperson	
(E2)	 then	stood	beside	E1	and	began	 filming	 the	subject.	Each	study	session	consisted	of	
three,	 ten-second	 trials:	 two	 familiarization	 trials	 and	 one	 test	 trial	 [Figure	 1].	 The	





Within	 each	 experimental	 session	 each	 subject	 monkey	 three	 trials	 total:	 two	
familiarization	trials	and	one	test	trial.	Each	trial	began	approximately	15-30	seconds	after	
the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 trial	 prior,	which	 is	 about	 the	 length	 of	 time	 it	 takes	 E1	 to	 lift	 the	
occluder	and	reset	the	stage.	The	goal	of	the	familiarizations	was	to	acquaint	monkeys	with	






















(acting	 inconsistently	with	her	 visual	perspective).	 In	both	conditions,	 the	E1	called	 “now”	













2008).	 Each	 session	 was	 clipped	 into	 three	 10-second	 trials	 and	 given	 a	 randomized	































behavior	 using	 her	 visual	 perspective,	 we	 first	 ran	 an	 independent	 samples	 t-test	 to	








To	 be	 sure	 that	 monkeys	 assigned	 to	 the	 inconsistent	 reach	 condition	 were	 not	
looking	longer	across	the	entire	study	session,	we	also	confirmed	that	the	looking	during	the	
familiarization	 trials	 were	 the	 same	 between	 conditions.	 Here	 we	 used	 an	 independent	











We	 then	 explored	whether	 Barbary	macaques’	 performance	 differed	 from	 that	 of	
rhesus	macaques	 using	 a	 two-way	 ANOVA	 (n	 =	 142;	 Barbary	macaques,	 n	 =	 80;	 Rhesus	
macaques,	n	=	62)	to	examine	the	effect	of	species	and	condition	on	looking	time.	Overall,	we	






expected	 test	 trials	 (M	 =	 3.48s,	 SD	 =	 2.21).	We	 also	 tested	 species	 differences	 in	 overall	
looking	time	(regardless	of	condition).	Here,	(t(140)	=	1.92,	p	=	0.057,	d	=	0.325)	we	found	













looked	at	whether	 sex	 affected	monkeys’	 task	 attention;	 a	model	 adding	 subject	 sex	 as	 a	












Here,	we	 found	 that	Barbary	macaques	 can	 take	 the	visual	perspective	of	 another	
agent	and	make	an	accurate	prediction	about	her	behavior.	This	finding	is	consistent	with	a	
previously	collected	dataset	(Marticorena	et	al.	2011)	on	rhesus	macaques	using	the	same	
task.	 Both	 Barbary	 and	 rhesus	 macaques	 look	 significantly	 longer	 in	 the	 unexpected	
condition,	in	which	an	agent	acts	inconsistently	with	her	visual	perspective	and	reaches	for	
an	 object	 in	 an	 empty	 box,	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 expected	 condition,	 where	 she	 reaches	
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how	species	differences	 in	social	 tolerance	affect	social	cognition.	Previous	work	 in	 these	
two	species	 (Joly	et	al.	2017;	Rosati	&	Santos	2017)	 found	 that	social	 tolerance	seems	 to	
affect	several	aspects	of	these	species’	social	cognitive	abilities.	Joly	and	colleagues	suggest	


















































the	 varying	 social	 tolerance	 environments	might	 lead	 to	 different	 paces	 of	 development	





















may	not	have	 to	compete	 for	as	many	resources	 (food,	water)	as	a	wild	population.	As	a	






populations	 engage	 in	 physical	 altercations	 to	 resolve	 hierarchical	 disputes	 and	 also	
disperse	between	groups	(Boelkins	&	Wilson	1972).	Thus,	while	our	free-ranging	subjects	
may	 have	 relatively	 limited	 competition	 over	 non-social	 resources,	 individuals	 in	 these	
populations	have	ample	opportunity	to	compete	socially.	Future	research,	however,	could	
follow	up	with	similar	tests	in	wild-living	or	captive	populations.	
	 In	addition,	 future	work	could	explore	how	rhesus	and	Barbary	macaques	 initially	
develop	 their	 visual	 perspective	 taking	 abilities.	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 tolerant	 and	 despotic	
species	 develop	 this	 capacity	 along	 different	 ontogenetic	 trajectories	 (Rosati	 et	 al.	 2014;	
Gómez	 2005).	 Indeed,	 recent	 work	 suggest	 that	 rhesus	 macaques	 may	 require	 some	
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Species	 Sex	 Condition	 N	 Age	(years)	
Barbary	 macaques	
(Macaca	sylvanus)	
F	 Expected	 19	 11.1	
Unexpected	 20	 11.4	




F	 Expected	 10	 8.9	
Unexpected	 12	 7.17	
















































-0.6151	 0.4239	 -1.451	 0.149	
sex	 (female	
baseline)	
0.8088	 0.4233	 1.911	 0.058	







































or	 (D2)	 crosses	 the	 stage	 and	 enters	 the	 orange	 box.	 The	 presenter	 then	 either	 acts	

































































































learn	 about	 their	 environment	 from	 other	 agents,	 and	 one	 that	 is	 well	 understood	 in	
nonhuman	primate	species.	Here,	across	two	experiments	we	looked	at	whether	monkeys	
attend	differently	to	gaze	cues	from	adult	and	infant	conspecific	images	and	also	the	role	that	




conspecific	 photos.	 We	 found	 no	 developmental	 differences	 in	 preferences	 for	 an	 adult	
versus	an	infant	conspecific	as	sources	of	information;	juvenile	and	adult	subjects	did	not	










































show	 a	 preference	 for	 learning	 from	 similar	 others,	 and	 will	 more	 faithfully	 attend	 to	









they	 may	 or	 may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 teach	 us,	 and	 as	 such	 children	 differentially	 attend	 to	
information	from	agents	in	these	different	categories.		
	 But	 how	did	 these	 preferences	 come	 about	 evolutionarily?	Humans	 are	 unique	 in	
their	propensity	to	seek	out	teaching	and	learning	experiences	(Whiten,	2000;	Tomasello,	
Kruger,	&	Ratner,	1993;	Whiten	&	van	de	Waal,	2017).	Not	even	our	closest	living	relatives,	
















both	 populations	 learned	 something	 from	witnessing	 the	 demonstration.	 But	 the	 species	








speciific	 process	 the	 demonstrator	 used,	 Subsequent	 studies	with	 chimpanzees	 (Myowa-
Yamakoshi	 &	Matsuzawa,	 2000;	 1999;	Whiten	 et	 al.,	 2009;	Whiten,	 Horner,	 &	Marshall-
Pescini,	2005)	and	other	apes	(Stoinksi	et	al.,	2001;	Stoinski	&	Whiten,	2003)	have	found	





















higher-ranking	 individual.	Overall,	 then,	primates	appear	 to	most	 reliably	use	 rank	when	
deciding	 from	whom	 to	 learn,	 preferring	 higher	 ranking	 informants	 over	 lower	 ranking	










previous	 studies	 were	 designed	 to	 compare	 primates’	 performance	 with	 that	 of	 human	
children,	and	 thus	 tend	 to	use	 the	sorts	of	puzzle	box	and	object	manipulation	 tasks	 that	
appeal	to	human	children.	We	know	that	primates	can	learn	from	others	in	a	lot	of	different	
contexts;	 learning	how	 to	physically	manipulate	 an	object	 is	 not	 the	only	way	 that	 other	
agents’	can	help	an	individual	learn.	For	both	of	these	reasons,	the	existing	studies	testing	









using	 the	gaze	of	other	agents	 to	 learn	about	 their	environments	 in	both	 in	experimental	
object	choice	tasks	(e.g.	Call,	Hare,	&	Tomasello,	1998;	Itakura	et	al.,	1999;	Barth,	Reaux,	&	





2006)	 and	 lemurs	 (Shepherd	 and	 Platt,	 2008;	 Ruiz,	 Roeder,	 and	 Byrne,	 2009;	 Sandel,	
MacLean,	 and	Hare,	 2011).	 Primates	 also	 appear	 sensitive	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 gaze	 cues	 are	
intentional	 and	 informational,	 as	 they	 adapt	 their	 gaze	 behavior	 with	 respect	 to	 the	
experimenters’	physical	and	perceptual	states.	When	the	experimenters’	view	differs	from	
their	 own,	 primates	 will	 adjust	 their	 physical	 position	 to	 align	 with	 the	 gaze	 of	 an	
experimenter	(Bräuer,	Call,	&	Tomasello,	2005;	Okamoto-Barth	et	al.	2007;	MacLean	&	Hare	




agents	 for	 in	 order	 to	 learn	 about	 their	 environment.	 Despite	 its	 usefulness	 for	 primate	
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extremely	 salient	 cue	 in	 primates	 (Rosenfield	 et	 al.,	 2019),	 and	 thus	 might	 provide	 a	
sufficient	 explanation	 without	 needing	 to	 posit	 a	 richer	 preference	 for	 learning	 from	
dominant	agents.		









frequent	 bouts	 of	 aggression	 to	 maintain	 social	 order	 (Maestripieri	 &	 Hoffman,	 2012;	
Thierry,	Iwaniuk,	&	Pellis,	2000).		
Living	 in	such	 large,	 complex	groups	requires	rhesus	monkeys	 to	be	perceptive	 to	





(Emery	 et	 al.,	 1997;	 Putnam	 et	 al.,	 2016)	 and	 photo	 (Shepherd,	 Deaner,	 &	 Platt,	 2006)	
presentations,	 and	 from	 a	 fairly	 young	 age	 (Rosati	 et	 al.,	 2016;	 Tomasello,	 Hare,	 &	
Fogelmman,	2001).		
But	 do	 rhesus	 macaques	 follow	 gaze	 differentially	 depending	 on	 an	 individual’s	
identity	or	expertise?	As	reviewed	above,	we	know	from	a	single	study	in	the	lab	that	rhesus	
macaques	 do	 preferentially	 follow	 the	 gaze	 of	 high-ranking	 others	 as	 compared	 to	 low-
ranking	 others	 (Shepherd,	 Deaner,	 &	 Platt,	 2006).	 However,	 this	 study	 had	 a	 relatively	
sample	size	(n=12)	and	the	subjects	were	limited	in	the	number	of	social	interactions	that	
they	 themselves	 had	 experienced	 and	 seen	 others	 experience	 in	 the	 sterilized	 lab	










The	 goal	 of	 this	 study	 was	 to	 test	 whether	 macaques	 in	 a	 free-living	 population	
showed	a	human-like	tendency	to	learn	from	agents	of	some	identities	over	others.	We	were	




proxy	 for	 social	 expertise	 here	 because	 older	 macaques	 would	 have	 more	 expertise	
attending	to,	following,	and	producing	their	own	cues	for	other	agents.	Thus,	if	subjects	are	
tracking	 social	 expertise,	 then	 we	 would	 expect	 them	 to	 gaze	 follow	 more	 often	 when	
presented	wtith	 social	 experts,	 namely	 adult	 conspecifics,	 as	 compared	 to	 social	 novices,	
infant	conspecifics.	We	therefore	presented	subjects	with	a	series	of	photographic	images	of	
an	individual	rhesus	macaque	making	a	gaze	cue.	We	varied	whether	the	photo	was	of	an	
adult	 versus	 an	 infant.	 In	 line	 with	 previous	 work,	 we	 anticipated	 that	 if	 subjects	 were	
attending	to	the	age	of	the	presenter,	they	would	preferentially	follow	the	gaze	of	an	adult	





the	 ability	 emerging	 around	 5	 months	 of	 age	 (Rosati	 et	 al.,	 2016;	 Tomasello,	 Hare,	 and	




























distinguish	 them	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 box,	 we	 covered	 both	 the	 window	 frame	 and	 the	
occluders	with	brightly	colored	blue	duct	tape.	We	mounted	each	photo	(8”	x	10”)	on	a	piece	
of	foamcore	and	affixed	with	a	handle.	To	allow	for	the	experimenter	to	align	the	photos	into	



















and	 the	monkey	 and	 called	 to	 get	 the	monkey’s	 attention.	 The	 cameraperson	 (E2)	 stood	
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which	 denoted	 the	 end	 of	 a	 trial.	 Monkeys	 were	 presented	 with	 up	 to	 three	 total	 gaze	
following	trials.		
Monkeys	 had	 to	 complete	 at	 least	 two	 trials	 for	 the	 session	 to	 be	 considered	
successful.	 131	 individuals	 completed	 all	 four	 trials,	 9	 completed	 three	 trials,	 and	 25	
completed	only	two	trials	[see	SI	Table	1	for	detailed	exclusion	information].		
	
Behavioral	 Coding.	We	 clipped	 experimental	 trials	 so	 that	 they	 could	 be	 coded	 blind	 to	
condition;	 we	 removed	 all	 identifying	 information	 (including	 subject	 ID,	 trial	 number,	
condition,	and	session	type)	from	each	clip	and	gave	each	a	randomized	identifying	code.	
One	 coder	 coded	 three	 variables:	 same	 side	 looking	 time,	different	 side	 looking	 time,	 and	
overall	 looking	time	to	the	apparatus	 for	all	of	the	clips	[for	definitions	of	each	dependent	
variable,	 see	 Table	 1].	 From	 these	 values,	 we	 were	 then	 able	 to	 calculate	 the	 following	
additional	dependent	variables:	first	look	accuracy,	first	look	behavior,	number	of	looks	back	
to	the	apparatus,	and	number	of	looks	in	the	same	and	different	directions.	Several	additional	
coders	 then	 re-coded	 each	 clip	 for	 reliability.	 In	 total,	 we	 used	 four	 reliability	 coders	 in	
Experiment	1		[for	a	summary	see	SI	Table	3].		Inter-observer	reliability	was	high,	greater	
















that	 the	 presenter’s	 identity	 plays	 in	 subjects’	 behavioral	 responses,	 we	 first	 ran	 a	
generalized	linear	mixed	model	using	presenter	identity	and	trial	type	as	a	fixed	effects	and	
subject	 id	 as	 a	 random	effect	 to	 see	 how	 these	 factors	 predicted	 looking	 time.	 Finally,	 to	
explore	developmental	differences,	we	categorized	each	subject	by	age	into	one	of	two	age	
cohorts:	subjects	under	age	5	were	categorized	as	juveniles,	and	subjects	over	the	age	of	5	

















trial	 types	 (adult	 photo	 vs.	 infant	 photo),	 binomial	 tests	 revealed	 that	 subjects	were	 not	
significantly	more	likely	to	make	their	first	look	in	the	same	direction	as	the	gaze	cue	(Figure	










looked	 longer	 in	 the	direction	 that	 the	 cue	was	presented	during	gaze	 following	 trials	 in	
	
	 131	
which	 a	 cue	 is	 presented,	 trials	 2-4,	 (M	 =	 1.89	 seconds,	 SD	 =	 1.95)	 as	 compared	 to	 the	
encoding	trial	in	which	no	cue	is	presented,	trial	1	(M	=	1.18	seconds,	SD	=	1.63).		
		 To	test	our	original	question	about	the	role	that	the	cue	presenter’s	identity	plays	in	
a	 subject’s	 behavioral	 response,	 we	 also	 looked	 at	 whether	 the	 cue	 presenter’s	 identity	
predicted	both	first	look	accuracy	and	overall	looking	time	in	the	same	direction	in	the	trials	







































versus	 an	 infant	 presenter.	 Subjects	 also	 spent	 the	 same	 amount	 of	 time	 looking	 in	 the	















that	 we	 may	 see	 different	 results	 when	 the	 cues	 are	 presented	 in	 tandem	 thus	 forcing	




The	 goal	 of	 Experiment	 2	 was	 to	 develop	 a	 method	 that	 would	 overcome	 some	 of	 the	
limitations	 of	 Experiment	 1.	 Experiment	 2	 developed	 a	 novel	 gaze	 choice	 paradigm	 that	
presented	both	the	adult	and	infant	gaze	cues	simultaneously	and	allowed	subjects	to	choose	
which	gaze	cue	to	follow.	Note	that	this	study	design	is	also	more	reflective	of	a	naturalistic	
social	 environment,	 where	 individuals	 are	 often	 inundated	with	 social	 information	 from	
multiple	agents	at	one	time,	and	must	selectively	attend	to	cues	from	only	the	most	useful	
agents.	 In	 line	with	our	original	hypothesis,	we	predicted	that	 if	monkeys	show	the	same	
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learning	preferences	as	human	children,	 then	 they	should	 look	 first	and	 for	 longer	 in	 the	
direction	of	the	adult	cue	as	compared	to	the	infant	cue	.		
	 In	 Experiment	 2,	we	 again	 tested	 for	 developmental	 differences	 in	 gaze	 following	
behavior.	In	Experiment	1,	we	found	that	adults	look	longer	in	response	to	a	cue	than	juvenile	
subjects,	though	they	were	not	more	accurate	in	their	first	look	behavior.	Given	that	adults	








































and	 the	monkey	 and	 called	 to	 get	 the	monkey’s	 attention.	 The	 cameraperson	 (E2)	 stood	









see	 four	 images	of	each	conspecific.	The	direction	 that	 the	adult	and	 infant	 remained	 the	
same	 within	 a	 single	 experimental	 session	 though	 the	 position	 was	 counterbalanced	
between	subjects.		
Monkeys	 had	 to	 complete	 at	 least	 two	 trials	 for	 the	 session	 to	 be	 considered	








variable,	 see	 Table	 1].	 From	 these	 values,	 we	 were	 then	 able	 to	 calculate	 the	 following	
additional	dependent	variables:	first	look	accuracy,	first	look	behavior,	number	of	looks	back	
to	the	apparatus,	and	number	of	looks	in	the	same	and	different	directions.	Several	additional	






Data	 analysis.	 We	 completed	 our	 analyses	 using	 RStudio	 statistical	 software,	 Version	
1.3.1093	(RStudio	Team,	2020).	In	the	final	dataset,	we	removed	all	trials	where	the	subject’s	












for	 Trials	 2-4	 comparing	 whether	 more	 subjects	 than	 chance	 made	 a	 first	 look	 in	 the	
direction	of	 the	adult	gaze	versus	 the	 infant	gaze.	Prior	 to	 running	any	analyses,	we	 first	



















































social	 expert	 (an	 adult	monkey)	 versus	 a	 social	 novice	 (an	 infant	monkey),	we	 hoped	 to	
provide	a	task	more	representative	of	a	naturalistic	situation	that	might	elicit	natural	gaze	
















We	 predicted	 that	 if	 monkeys	 were	 able	 to	 track	 social	 expertise,	 then	 they	 should	
preferentially	follow	the	cues	of	adult	monkeys	as	compared	to	infants.	In	Experiment	1,	we	













gaze	 behavior.	 In	 Experiment	 2,	 subjects	 were	 presented	 with	 two	 simultaneous	 and	
conflicting	cues—	adult	and	infant	photos	that	looked	in	an	opposite	direction	at	the	same	
time.	We	reasoned	that	if	socioecological	validity	was	an	issue	in	Experiment	1,	then	subjects	
















left	 or	 right.	 While	 we	 made	 every	 effort	 to	 make	 the	 gaze	 photograph	 cue	 appear	
















For	example,	dominance	plays	a	key	role	 in	 the	social	 lives	of	primates,	making	 it	a	good	













preference	 for	dominant	 individuals	 across	 experiments	 and	 species	 (Van	de	Waal	 et	 al.,	
2010;	Renevey	et	al.,	2013;	Bono	et	al.,	2018;	Grampp	et	al.,	2019;	Coelho	et	al.,	2015;	Deaner,	
Shepherd,	 &	 Platt,	 2006),	 future	 work	 could	 look	 at	 dominance	 as	 a	 marker	 for	 social	
expertise.		
Another	 future	 direction	 concerns	 individual	 differences	 driving	 looking	 behavior	
differences.	 We	 found	 that	 while	 juveniles	 and	 adults	 were	 not	 different	 in	 their	 gaze	
accuracy,	 they	 did	 show	 some	 differences	 in	 their	 gaze	 behavior.	 Overall,	 adults	 looked	
longer	than	juveniles	in	the	same	direction	as	the	cue	presented	(Experiment	1)	and	in	the	
same	direction	as	the	adult	cue	(Experiment	2).	In	contrast,	we	found	that	juveniles	spend	






during	 this	 critical	 learning	 phase,	 the	 juvenile	 period,	 but	 fade	 across	 the	 lifespan.	



















on.	 Moving	 forward,	 examining	 whether	 other	 social	 categories	 can	 turn	 on	 human-like	
preferences	for	different	agents	will	be	critical	for	determining	whether	this	is	definitively	
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Overall	looking	time	 The	 time	 (in	 seconds)	 that	 the	subject	 spent	 looking	at	 the	
apparatus	out	of	10	possible	seconds		
Same	side	looking	time	 The	 time	 (in	seconds)	 that	 the	subject	 spent	 looking	 in	 the	
same	 direction	 as	 the	 presented	 cue	 out	 of	 10	 possible	
seconds	
Different	side	looking	time	 The	 time	 (in	seconds)	 that	 the	subject	 spent	 looking	 in	 the		













Number	 of	 looks	 in	 the	
different	direction	
















Trial	 Cue	Presenter	 Average	 Looking	 Time	
(seconds)	
SD	
2	 Infant	 1.86	 1.97	
Adult	 1.73	 2.00	
3	 Infant	 1.62	 2.22	
Adult	 1.64	 2.55	






























































































































































































































































out	 to	 explore	 whether	 different	 early	 life	 experiences	 affect	 the	 development	 of	
sociocognitive	 abilities	 in	 non-human	 primates.	 Specifically,	 I	 looked	 at	 sociocognitive	
development	 in	 rhesus	 macaques,	 which	 are	 among	 some	 of	 the	 most	 studied	 primate	
subjects	 in	 the	 domain	 of	 social	 cognition.	 This	 expansive	 sociocognitive	 research	 (for	 a	
review,	see	Drayton	&	Santos,	2016;	Arre	&	Santos,	in	press)	with	adult	macaques	serves	as	
the	perfect	foundation	to	investigate	how	different	early	life	experiences	contribute	to	the	
ontogeny	of	sociocognitive	abilities.	 In	Chapter	2,	 I	 investigated	whether	macaques	share	
similarities	 in	 the	 development	 of	 their	 visual	 representational	 abilities	 with	 humans.	 I	
















represent	 the	 perceptual	 states	 of	 others	 (Marticorena	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Flombaum	&	 Santos,	
2005;	 Santos,	 Nissen,	 &	 Ferrugia,	 2006),	 and	 that	 these	 representations	 appear	 flexible	
(Drayton	&	Santos,	2017;	Bettle	&	Rosati,	2019).	However,	we	know	very	little	about	how	






comparative	 approach,	we	 found	 that	 unlike	 human	 infants	 (Onishi	&	Baillargeon,	 2005;	
Träuble,	 Marinović,	 &	 Pauen,	 2010;	 Kovács,	 Téglás,	 &	 Endress,	 2010),	 infant	 rhesus	
macaques	do	not	predict	that	other	agents	will	act	based	on	their	visual	perspective.	Older	
juvenile	macaques	tested	on	the	task	(aged	1-5	years	old),	showed	the	opposite,	trending	in	












same	age.	Human	 infants	 as	 young	as	7	months	 appear	 capable	of	not	only	 representing	
where	others	will	act	based	on	their	visual	perspective	(Onishi	&	Baillargeon,	2005;	Träuble,	
Marinović,	 &	 Pauen,	 2010;	 Kovács,	 Téglás,	 &	 Endress,	 2010;	 Luo,	 2011),	 but	 also	 more	






both	 age	 cohorts,	 I	 did	 observe	 an	 interesting	pattern	when	 comparing	 cohorts.	Namely,	
while	juveniles	showed	a	pattern	in	the	“correct”	adult-like	direction	suggesting	they	may	be	
capable	 of	 representing	what	 the	 agent	 can	 see,	 infant	monkeys	 demonstrated	 the	 exact	
opposite	pattern,	looking	longer	in	the	expected	condition.	If	both	of	these	results	replicated	










more	of	 this	kind	of	experience	early	on	 in	 life	such	that	 they	develop	this	capacity	at	an	










possible	 that	monkeys’	 capacity	 to	 represent	 others’	 perceptual	 awareness	 comes	 online	
during	this	period	because	of	their	experience	attending	to	and	using	the	visual	awareness	
















predicted,	 such	 a	 pattern	would	 indicate	 that	 infant	 subjects	were	 representing	 the	 two	
scenes	differently.	The	patten	also	fits	with	what	 is	occasionally	observed	in	 looking	time	
studies	 in	human	 infant	populations	who	 sometimes	 show	a	 shorter	 looking	 response	 to	
novel	stimuli	(Hunter	&	Ames,	1988;	Houston-Price	&	Nakai,	2004).	Thus,	the	infant	results	
in	 Chapter	 2	 could	 indicate	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 human-like	 neophobic	 response	 to	 new	or	
unusual	stimuli,	in	other	words,	an	agent	acting	inconsistently	with	her	visual	perspective.	If	
we	 observed	 this	 result,	 a	 generous	 interpretation	 could	 be	 that	 infant	 macaques	 do	
understand	 that	 agents	 should	 act	 consistently	with	 their	 visual	 perspective,	 and	 have	 a	
preference	for	agents	that	do	exactly	this	(or	an	aversion	to	the	opposite	case).		While	I	tested	






test	 this	 open	 question.	 Specifically,	 future	 work	 could	 test	 whether	 young	 primates	 do	
indeed	 require	 repeated	 exposure	 to	 seeing	 others	 act	 in	 accordance	 with	 their	 visual	
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perspective	 in	order	 to	make	 the	same	predictions	as	a	human	 infant	would	on	our	 task.	









2003),	 an	 ability	 that	 primates	 never	 acquire	 (Leavens	 &	 Hopkins,	 1988a;	 Leavens	 &	
Hopkins,	 1988b).	 Subsequently,	 primates	 are	 left	 to	 interpret	 more	 subtle	 cues	 like	 eye	
direction	and	other	attentional	cues,	while	human	infants	have	more	direct	gesture	abilities	















human	 unique	 social	 cognition	 is	 the	 result	 of	 a	 hyper-friendliness	 and	 willingness	 to	
cooperate	(Hare	&	Woods,	2020;	Hare,	2017;	Hermann,	et	al.,	2017;	Tomasello,	2019).	Under	
this	 view,	 experience	 interpreting	and	using	 the	 social	 cues	of	others	 to	 cooperate,	work	
together,	and	engage	in	joint	activities	is	what	drove	human-like	social	cognition	to	emerge.	
The	 second	 theory,	 the	 Machiavellian	 intelligence	 hypothesis,	 argues	 instead	 that	
competition	drove	our	unique	human	specific	cognition;	by	exploiting	the	mental	states	of	


















studies	might	 need	 to	 test	 a	more	 complex	 or	 variable	 sociocognitive	 ability	 to	 find	 true	
tolerance-based	differences.		A	related	possibility	is	that	while	experience	may	play	a	role	in	
the	 ontogeny	 of	 monkeys’	 capacity	 to	 represent	 what	 others	 see,	 experience	 with	
environments	of	different	social	tolerance	may	not	be	the	correct	type	of	social	experience	
to	vary	in	order	to	test	this	question.	It’s	possible	that	the	capacity	to	represent	what	others	
see	 plays	 a	 fundamental	 role	 in	 being	 a	 successful	 social	 primate	 regardless	 of	 whether	
you’re	using	these	representations	to	cooperate	or	compete	with	other	individuals.		
An	additional	puzzle	concerns	the	contrasting	results	that	I	observed	in	Chapters	2	and	
3.	The	 results	of	Chapter	2	 suggested	 that	 early	 experience	 likely	does	play	a	 role	 in	 the	














in	 the	 development	 of	 visual	 perspective	 understanding	 ability	 by	 comparing	 primate	
species	that	vary	in	their	natural	group	sizes	using	the	same	task	in	Chapters	2	and	3.	If	the	
social	 brain	hypothesis	were	 correct	 (Dunbar,	 1998),	 I	would	predict	 that	 sociocognitive	
abilities	would	develop	earlier	and	faster	in	species	who	grew	up	larger	groups.	These	results	
would	suggest	that	social	group	size	might	be	a	better	feature	of	social	environment	with	




Another	way	 to	 explain	 the	discrepancy	 in	 Chapters	 2	 and	3	 concerns	 a	 limitation	 of	








perspective	 representations	 at	 a	 slower	 pace	 than	 humans,	 but	 still	 reach	 adult-like	
competencies	by	age	five.	It	is	possible	that	because	our	subject	population	in	Chapter	3	was	
made	up	of	mostly	adults,	I	may	have	seen	bigger	differences	had	I	tested	subjects	closer	to	
the	 juvenile	 period	 of	 ages	 2-5	 years.	 To	 answer	 this	 definitively,	 future	 studies	 should	
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people	 that	 they	deem	to	be	efficient	 teachers,	 (Zmyj	et	al.,	2010;	Nielsen	&	Blank,	2011;	
Birch,	 Vauthier,	 &	 Bloom,	 2008;	 Jaswal	 &	 Malone,	 2007;	 Wood,	 Kendal,	 &	 Flynn,	 2012;	
Seehagen	&	Herbert,	2011;	Jaswal	&	Neely,	2006;	Elekes	&	Kiraly,	2012),	and	children	prefer	








































(Maestripieri	 &	 Hoffman,	 2013),	 and	we	 know	 very	 little	 about	 how	monkeys	 attend	 to	








testing	macaques	 on	 a	 version	of	 this	 task	where	 the	 conspecific	 photos	 varied	 in	 group	
status.		
	 A	second	reason	for	the	null	results	I	found	in	Chapter	4	concerns	the	rank	status	of	
the	 photos	 I	 used	 in	my	 study.	 I	 chose	 photos	 of	 high-ranking	 individuals	 as	 conspecific	
models	 because	 previous	 work	 demonstrated	 that	 high-ranking	 individuals	 would	 be	
especially	interesting	to	conspecifics	(Watson	et	al.,	2012;	Shepherd,	Deaner,	&	Platt,	2006).	
I	also	reasoned	that	dominance	might	serve	as	a	primate-like	version	of	a	social	feature	that	





high-raking	 alpha	 individuals	 undergo	 a	 lot	 of	 stress	 and	 show	high	 levels	 of	 circulating	
stress-related	hormones	 (Sapolsky,	1992),	especially	 in	 species	 like	 the	 rhesus	macaques	
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4).	 Although	 previous	 lab	 results	 show	 that	 rhesus	 monkeys	 attend	 more	 to	 the	 social	
information	 presented	 by	 high-ranking,	 as	 compared	 to	 low-ranking	 others	 (Shepherd,	





that	 humans	 are	 using	 different,	 and	 perhaps	 unique,	markers	 of	 expertise,	 like	 age	 and	
competence,	ones	that	are	not	shared	by	other	socially	living	primates.			







tolerance.	 For	 instance,	 the	 two	 species	 that	we	 tested	 in	Chapter	3,	 rhesus	 and	Barbary	
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macaques,	 also	vary	 in	 the	way	 that	 they	 treat	 conspecifics	of	different	ages.	 Specifically,	
rhesus	macaques	seem	not	to	discriminate	much	between	adults	and	infant	others	in	their	
social	behaviors,	whereas	Barbary	macaques	preferentially	attend	 to	and	will	go	 to	great	
lengths	 to	 interact	 with	 infant	 conspecifics	 (Whiten,	 1987;	 Maestripieri,	 1998)	 even	
exchanging	other	social	behaviors,	like	grooming,	for	infant	handling	opportunities	(Deag,	
1980;	 Paul,	 Kuester,	 &	 Arnemann,	 1996),	 and	 using	 infants	 as	 “social	 buffering”	 tools	 to	
deescalate	antagonistic	 interactions	(Taub,	1980;	Deag,	1980;	Deag	&	Crook,	1971).	Thus,	
Barbary	macaques	might	be	uniquely	poised	to	explore	the	question	of	whether	experience	
plays	 in	 monkeys’	 abilities	 to	 track	 social	 expertise,	 as	 Barbary	 macaques	 have	 more	
experience	 interacting	 with	 individuals	 across	 different	 ages	 than	 rhesus	 macaques	 do	
(Maestripieri,	1998).	Future	work	could	test	this	question	directly	by	running	the	same	study	







	 The	 results	 of	Chapter	4	 also	beg	 the	question	of	whether	 gaze	 following	was	 the	
correct	behavior	to	choose	when	studying	the	question	of	social	learning.	Historically,	some	
have	argued	that	primate	gaze	following	is	largely	a	reflexive	behavior,	not	one	that	indicates	
any	 sort	 of	 mental	 state	 representation	 (Povinelli	 &	 Giambrone,	 1999).	 	 Furthermore,	
relative	 to	 other	 types	 of	 information	 seeking	 behaviors,	 like	 searching	 or	 physical	
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manipulation	 of	 an	 object,	 gaze	 following	 is	 a	 low-cost	 activity	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 energy	
expenditure	and	opportunity	cost;	gaze	followers	need	not	even	move	their	heads	to	gaze	
follow,	as	even	saccades	in	the	same	direction	as	the	cue	would	give	them	visual	access.	Thus,	
subjects	 in	 the	 task	 might	 be	 gaze	 following	 indiscriminately	 regardless	 of	 the	 cue	
presenter’s	identity.	There	are	a	couple	of	problems	with	this	interpretation.	First,	we	know	
from	previous	work	in	rhesus	macaques	that	subjects	do	not	gaze	follow	indiscriminately.	In	
gaze	 following	 tasks	 with	 repeated	 trials,	 subjects	 will	 habituate	 in	 response	 to	 non-
informational	cues,	gaze	following	less	across	trials	when	they	learn	that	the	presenter	is	not	
providing	useful	information	(Rosati	et	al.,	2016).	Additionally,	other	work	has	shown	that	

















here	 and	 the	 previous	 work	 conducted	 with	 this	 population?	 A	 critical	 methodological	
difference	 is	 that	 presenters	 in	 the	 previous,	 successful,	 tasks	 all	 used	 live	 human	
demonstrators	(Rosati	et	al.,	2016;	Drayton	&	Santos,	2017;	Bettle	&	Rosati,	2019),	whereas	
my	 task	 (Chapter	 4)	 used	 photographs	 of	 conspecifics.	 While	 there	 is	 precedent	 for	








methodological	 limitation	mostly	to	explain	the	 low	rates	of	 looking	in	the	task	overall,	 it	
could	also	be	a	contributing	factor	to	the	lack	of	difference	we	see	in	attentional	difference	
to	adults	and	infant	informants.	If	wild	populations	are	not	treating	photographs	as	agentic	
at	all,	 it	 is	unlikely	that	they	would	ascribe	any	sort	of	 informational	or	expertise	state	to	
either	conspecifics’	photograph	either.	Future	work	could	test	whether	the	lack	of	dynamic	








Overall,	 the	pattern	of	results	across	 the	 three	chapters	presented	 in	 this	dissertation	
suggest	that	different	types	of	experience	play	a	role	in	the	development	of	social	cognitive	
abilities	 like	 understanding	 what	 others	 see	 and	 a	 preference	 for	 gaze	 following	 to	






early-life	 experience	 in	 a	 socially	 tolerant	 environment	 were	 no	 better	 at	 forming	 an	







traits	 are	 better	 markers	 of	 expertise,	 and	 thus	 more	 salient,	 in	 a	 gaze	 following	
discrimination	 task.	 Further,	 future	 work	 will	 benefit	 from	 using	 natural	 features	 of	
primates’	 social	 ecology,	 like	 the	 way	 that	 Barbary	 macaques	 treat	 adult	 versus	 infant	
conspecifics,	to	address	the	question	about	the	role	of	experience	with	different	aged	agents	
in	 primates’	 abilities	 to	 ascribe	 different	 levels	 of	 expertise	 to	 conspecifics.	 The	 overall	
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least	 one	 sociocognitive	 ability	 in	 monkeys—representing	 what	 other	 see—	 but	 the	
particular	 window	 in	 which	 such	 experience	 takes	 its	 effect	 may	 be	 rather	 narrow.	 In	
Chapter	2,	I	identified	that	monkeys	show	a	developmental	delay	in	their	ability	to	represent	
what	 others	 see	 relative	 to	 human	 infants.	 However,	 the	 specific	 type	 of	 experience	
responsible	 for	 this	developmental	pattern	was	unclear.	Chapter	3	begins	 to	 rule	out	 the	
possibility	that	experience	with	different	social	tolerances	played	a	role	in	the	development	
of	this	visual	perspective	taking	capacity,	though	sadly	the	study	was	unable	to	subjects	at	
younger	 ages	 preventing	 us	 from	 making	 too	 strong	 of	 claims	 about	 the	 role	 of	 social	
tolerance	in	the	early	development	of	representing	what	others	can	see.	Finally,	Chapter	4	
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